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time of the modified California decree, was the only one with
25
power to affect the status of the children.

-G.
STATE REGULATION

OF INTERSTATE

E. .

TRANSMISSION OF NATURAL

GAS AND ELECTRICITY.-Mluch confusion still exists in the cases as
to what are the correct criteria of the extent of a state's power
to regulate interstate commerce.- Doubtless the problem is one
which, because of the vast diversity of interests involved, may not
be solved by fixed rules.2
At any rate as the cases undoubtedly
establish the fact that the states can, under some circumstances,
directly regulate interstate commerce, 3 it seems certain that sooner
or later the courts must discard the commonly-asserted "doctrinethat the state cannot under any guise impose direct burdens
upon interstate commerce." 4 Of course, it is generally laid down
along with the above-mentioned doctrine that
"As to those subjects which require a general system oruniformity of regulation the power of Congress is exclusive. In other matters, admitting of diversity of treatment
according to the special requirements of local conditions, the
states may act Within their respective jurisdictions until Congress sees fit to act." 5
But considerable confusion has arisen in applying these criteriz
because, among other reasons, in working out the constitutionality
or unconstitutionality of a given state regulation, it is common to.
start with the tacit assumption that the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce is princt facie exclusive, thus rendering any state regulation of interstate commerce prima facie unconstitutional. Such a method of approaching the problem, however,
seems misleading and conducive to erroneous conclusions. The
states had power to regulate interstate commerce before Congress
2 The case is supported by Professor Beale on this ground. See Beale, "Progress.
of the Law: Conflict of Laws," supra, 59.
1 U. S. CONSTITUTION, Art I, § 8: "The Congress shall have power.
. . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
tes, and with the
Indian tribes."
Cf. In re Pennsylvania Gas Co., 225 N. Y. 397, 122 N. E. 260 (1919): "No.
general formula can tell us in advance where the line is to be drawn."
a Some of the leading cases in point are discussed in this note and cited In
footnotes 14, 16, 18 and 23, infra.
4 See e. g., The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 400, 33. Slfp. Ct. Rep.
729 (1913), ver Mr. Justice Hughes.
5 Ibid., 399. This form of statement has been commonly followed since the leadIng case of Cooley ,. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851).
See one or
the latest statements of these criteria in Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service
Commission, U. S. Adv. Ops. 1919-20, 306.
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was granted such power.' Therefore, as a grant of power to Congress operates as a prohibition upon the states only to the extent
that such prohibition appears by express words or by reasonable
implication, the conclusion seems clear that we must start with the
theory that there is no such presumption and that the states retain
their sovereign powers, including their powers to regulate interstate commerce, except so far as the Federal Constitution limits
those powers expressly or by reasonable implication.
What, then, are the correct criteri of the extent of a state's
power to regulate interstate commerce ? It is commonly said that
state regulations affecting interstate commerce are constitutional
if they only indirectly affect and do not directly regulate such
commerce. But this is clearly inaccurate, for, as we shall see,
the states may under some circumstances directly regulate interstate commerce. Besides, as "commerce among the states is not.
a technical legal conception but a practical one"" it should be.
dealt with in a practical way.9 Hence, in determining the constitutionality, under the commerce clause, of a state regulation affecting interstate transportation the practical effect of the regulation
should prevail over any refined distinction, however logical, between direct and indirect regulations.
A recent West Virginia decision 0 and a similar New York decision"' illustrate the difficulty that attends any attempt to apply
the commonly-accepted criteria under all circumstances. In the
West Virginia case an electric plant generated electricity in Virginia and transmitted the electric current directly to consumers
in West Virginia. The question was whether, in the absence of
congressional action, an order of the West Virginia Public Service Commission regulating this service was an unconstitutional
regulation of interstate commerce. The court held that there was
nothing between production in Virginia and sale in West Virginia to break the continuity of the interstate transportation, but
reasoned that 2 "the vital distinction should be noted between
regulation of rates of transportation and of the rates at which a
commodity [while still being transported in interstate commerce]
6 See PRENTICE AND EGAN, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
1. 10, 11 et seq.
7 Missouri, Kansas & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488
(1898) ; Sllz v. Hesterberg, 211 U. "S. 31, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10 (1908) ; Pennsylvania
Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra.
8. Per Mr. Justice Holmes in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 398,
25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276 (1905).
See 25 W. VA. L. QUAR. 222, 280.
10 Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Public Service 0-ommiwinn, 10A0 ; R 557 (W. Va.
1939).
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shall be sold" to the consumer. The same distinction was rather
recently drawn by the Court of Appeals of New York in a case'
dealing with the constitutionality, under the commerce clause, of a
state regulation of the rate at which natural gas, in the course
of interstate transportation, may be sold directly to consumers.
But is the alleged distinction a practical distinction? It is subnitted that such a regulation of the so-called "rate of sale" is,
in practical effect, just as much a burden upon the interstate
transportation as if the regulation was by express words a regulation of the "rate of transportation". To regulate the rate at
which a thing so transported may be sold by the transporter while
in the course of such transportation is, in practical effect, to regulate the rate of transportation, for such rate of transportation is
necessarily included in the so-called "rate of sale."
Thus the question raised by the two cases is whether such a state
regulation, if a regulation of the rate for interstate transportation,
is an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce. As
has been intimated, it is not a sufficient answer to say that if the
:state regulation is a direct regulation of iterstate transportation it
i-s unconstitutional, for, notwithstanding the common statement to
the contrary, many state regulations, though direct regulations
,of interstate transportation, are constitutional. Thus, in the absence of congressional action the United States Supreme Court
lhas held that a state may under certain circumstances directly re*-ilate the rate for interstate transportation. For example, a state
-may regulate the through rate to be charged for out-bound interstate transportation by ferry14 (when the ferry is not operated as a
part of a railroad' 5). Similarly, the Supreme Court has rather
recently held that in the absence of congressional action a state
. nay constitutionally regulate the rate to be charged for transporstation by steamboat between termini within the state where a part
of the route is outside the United States, viz., on the high seas.' 8
'Likewise, a state may in the absence of congressional action make
reasonable quarantine and pilotage regulations although they may

1 In
22

.4

re Pennsylvania Gas Co., supra.

Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra, 562.

11 Port Richmond & Bergen Point Ferry Co. v. Hudson County, 234 U. S. 317,

Sup. Ct. Rep. 821 (1914).
15 New York Central Ry. Co. v. Hudson County, 227 U. S. 248, 33 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 269 (1913).
The reasons why a state normally may not regulate interstate

-railroad rates apply with equal force to any attempt by a state to regulate interstate
terry rates when the ferry is operated as a part of a railroad:
(1) Such interstate transportation is no longer local in nature. (2) Congress has regulated such
-eommerce.
16 Wilmington Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 236 U. S.
:151, 35 Supt. Ct. Rep. 276 (1915).
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operate as "direct' 1 7 regulations of interstate commerce. So,
although it was until lately thought otherwise, it seems that in the
absence of congressional action a state may regulate the rate of toll
to be charged for crossing an interstate bridge from the state passing the regulation to another state but not the rate for returning
from the other state' 8 (except possibly in ease of round-trip tickets
or perhaps passes issued in the state enacting the regulation but
not required by such state to be so issued 9 ). The famous Covington Bridge Case, 20 which is generally supposed to be contra. to
the last-mentioned statement, has rather recently been explained
by the United States Supreme Court2 ' on the ground that the
state regulation of the interstate toll which was there held unconstitutional was an attempt by the state passing the regulation
" 'to reach out and secure for itself a right to prescribe a rate
of toll applicable not only to persons crossing from Kentucky to
Ohio but from Ohio to Kentucky," a right which practically nullified the corresponding right of Ohio to fix tolls from her own state.
And this (explained the court) was an adequate basis for the
22
judgment." ,
In the light of these cases and other analogous cases too numerous to mention, 2' it is indisputable that the states may under
some circumstances "directly" regulate interstate commerce and
may directly regulate even to the extent of regulating the rate for
interstate transportation. But when and to what extent? As
was recently observed by the New York Court of Appeals :21
"No general formula can tell us in advance where the line is to
17That such regulations, though admittedly constitutional, may be "direct" regulations of interstate commerce. See Mr. Justice Hughes in Port Richmond & Bergen
Point Ferry Co. v. Hudson County, supra, and authorities there'n cited.

I8 Shrader v. Steubenville etc. Traction Co.. 99 S. E. 207 (W. Va. 1919).
See State v. Faudre, 54 W. Va. 122, 46 S. E. 269 (1903) observations of the United
States Supreme Court in Port Richmond & Bergen Point Ferry Co. V. Hudson County,
supra.
10 See the first two cases mentioned in note 18. In the United States Supreme
Court case, which the West Virginia case thought left the point undecided, the court
said (at p. 333) : "With respect to the rates for round trips we do not construe the
ordinance [of New Jersey regulating rates] as requiring the company to issue
round-trip tickets at its office in New Jersey . . . Viewed as a limitation upon
rates charged for such round-trip tickets, when sold by the company in

New Jersey,

we think that the ordinance is valid being one relating to the transactions of the
company in New Jersey and the charges there enforced."
2D Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 14 Sup. CL Rep.
1087 (1894).
In Port Richmond & Bergen Point Ferry Co. v. Hudson County, supra.
Ibid., 328, 329.
E. g., Chosen Freeholders of Hudson County v. The State, 4 Zab. 718 (N. J.
1853) ; State v. Faudre, 54 W. Va. 122, 46 S. E. 269 (1903) ; Shrader v. Steubenville etc. Traction Co., 99 S. E. 207 (W. Va. 1919). The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals

held in

the case last cited that In the absence

of congressional

action a state may declare invalid the use of a pass over an interstate bridge, not
only from the state enacting the regulation but also from the adjoining state.
24 In rc Pennsylvania Gas Co., supra.
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be drawn."
The unforseen and unforseeable growth of interstate commerce, more particularly in kind than in quantity, has
emphasized the fact that the commerce clause, like the Constitution itself, is not a mere written instrument of authority or limitation of authority, but a living embodiment of governmental
principles, and that these fundamental principles must be ever
applicable to the changing conditions of commerce and society.
Hence, the extent of the implied limitation upon the power of the
states under the commerce clause cannot be determined by inelastic
criteria. Each case, because of the ever-varying conditions and
classes of commerce, must be decided largely on its own peculiar
facts. Still there are some fundamental principles which must be
applied, and the most appropriate method of approaching the
problem and applying these principles seems to be as follows:
The continuous regulation of interstate commerce by "some"
authority, state or national, is imperatively required. And in the
absence of national action not only may the states regulate such
commerce, subject of course to certain (hereinafter-mentioned)
limitations, but there is no presumption that the power of Congress is exclusive. Some classes of interstate commerce, however,
are of such a local nature and differ so materially in different
localities that as a practical matter adequate regulations thereof'
can, as a rule, be made only by the local authorities. Hence,
while Congress may regulate such commerce, if Congress does not
do so, then, since interstate corinierce must be dealt with in a,
practical way, it cannot be reasonably inferred that, in the absence
of congressional action, the grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce was intended to operate as an implied prohibition
upon the states to continue to regulate such commerce. But
as to all other classes of commerce there is, because of the morethan-local nature of such commerce, an inherent need for such
uniformity of regulation as can be adequately accomplished, as a
practical matter, only by the action of a single regulatory power.
Hence, as to these classes of commerce the reasonable inference
is that, even in the absence of congressional action, the grant
of power to Congress to regulate commerce was intended to operate.
as an implied prohibition upon the states to regulate such commerce at all. Consequently the ultimate question is this: In the.
absence of congressional action is the state regulation such that
under all the circumstances of the given case it is, as a practical
matter, the reasonable inference from the grant of power to.
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Congress that a state was under such circumstances impliedly
prohibited from regulating commerce as it did in the particular
case? In answering that question it is necessary to bear in mind
the underlying purpose of the commerce clause, viz., to prevent
conflicting and discriminating state regulations of interstate commerce. 25 The test, then, of the extent of the power of a state
to regulate interstate commerce when Congress has not acted
seems to be whether, in view of- the purpose of the commerce
clause, the regulation, under all the circumstances of the particular
case, is an unreasonables regulation of interstate commerce. And
in deciding whether the regulation is reasonable or unreasonable
in the above-mentioned sense the determining criterion seems to
be whether the regulation in its practical operation involves a real
danger of irreconcilable regulations of the same subjectmatter
by the other interested state or states.
Accordingly, it would seem that in the absence of congressional
action a state has power to regulate the rate for the transmission
into the state of natural gas and electricity, at least under circumstances like those in the West Virginia and New York cases
where the transmission is for a comparatively short distance.27
For, just as in the above-mentioned Ferry Rate Case28 and Toll
Bridge Case,29 such interstate commerce differs so materially in
different localities, both as to cost of transportation and otherwise, that there is no inherent need for such uniformity of regulation as may be secured only by the action of a single regulatory
power. And, as the regulation of such rate of transportation cannot be an unreasonable regulation (for if unreasonable in the
sense here used it would be void as a violation of the "due process"
clause), there is, therefore, no real danger of irreconcilable state
regulations of such interstate transmission. Perhaps it should be
pointed out parenthetically that a mere possibility of irreconcilable
5 As to the purpose of the commerce clause see County of Mobile V. Kimball, 102
U. S. 691, 697, 26 JL. Ed. 238, 239 (1880).
5 Of. a very recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court in which it was
said: "It may be conceded that the local rates (fixed by the state) may affect
the interstate business of the company. But this fact does not prevent the state
from making local regulations of a reasonable character." Pennsylvania Gas Co.
v. Public Service Commission, U. S. Adv. Ops. 1919-20, 306, 303. This case is
an affirmance of In re Pennsylvania Gas Co., supra, in which the New York Court
distinguished between state regulations of rates for interstate transportation and
state regulations of the rates at which the thing, while being transported in interstate commerce, may be sold directly to the consumers. The United States Supreme
Court, however, in affirming the actual conclusion, did not make the distinction drawn
by the state court.
-7 This is apparently the view recently taken by the United States Supreme Court in
Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra.
28 Port Richmond & Bergen Point Ferry Co. v. Hudson County, supra.
21 Shrader v. Steubenville etc. Traction Co., supra.
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regulations should not invalidate such a regulation, for, as already
observed, interstate commerce, being a practical conception, should
be dealt with in a practical way. Hence, the West Virginia case
and the New York case, in holding constitutional such state regulation of the rate of sale, are clearly correct in conclusion. 0
But, since such a regulation of the so-called "rate of sale" includes, in practical effect, a regulation of the rate of transportation,
it would seem to follow that there is, in this respect, no practical
distinction between two sorts of state regulations. Therefore,
since a state can regulate such "rate of sale", a fortiori it would
seem that a state can regulate such rate of transportation, for certainly under the implied prohibitions of the commerce clause a
state cannot do by indirection what it cannot do directly."

-T. P. H.

COUNTY IN WHICH PROCESS MAY

BE

SERVED UPON AN OFFICER OR

some few years ago, it had been
the uniform practice in West Virginia to serve process upon an
officer or agent of a corporation in the county in which he resided.
Prior to acts of 1903, it was understood to be erroneous in all instances if the return did not show that the officer or agent was
served in the county in which he resided.- This requirement grew
out of a rather curious chain of statutory construction whereby
chapter 50 of the Code is made to control the service of process in
the circuit courts.
It wlll be noted that section 7 of chapter 124 of the Code designates the officers and agents of a corporation upon whom service
may be had in the circuit courts, but fails to specify any place of
service. The Supreme Court early felt that it was under the necessity of seeking elsewhere for some statute fixing the place of
service.2 Section 6 of chapter 41 of the Code provides as follows:
AGENT OF A CORPORATION.-Until

"The service of process, when person or property is not to
be taken into custody, or it is not otherwise specially provided,
30 Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comlssion, supra, In which the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion of the New York court.
31 For a collection of cases in point see 7 A. L. R. 1094, an annotation on the
West Virginia case herein discussed.
1 See cases cited In Stout v. B. & 0. R. Co., 64 W. Va. 502, 506, 63 S. E. 817, 131
Am. St. Rep. 940 (1918).
2 It has always been very doubtful to the writer, for reasons that need not be
stated here, whether It was ever intended that chapter 50 of the Code should control the service of process in the circuit courts.
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